High-profile global gatherings such as the recent World Economic Forum in Austria bring renewed scrutiny to our collective dependence on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). This dependence underpins everything from aviation safety and emergency response to communications, finance and energy infrastructure. Yet the degradation of GNSS is far easier to achieve than many assume, with potentially severe consequences.
While deliberate GNSS jamming is typically illegal, disruption can arise from a broad range of sources. These include malicious interference, as well as natural phenomena like solar flares or technical anomalies within satellite constellations. However, it seems the problem is on the rise. According to IATA, GNSS interference is impacting over 5% of commercial flights within Europe, with a 220% increase in signal loss events between 2021 and 2024. Recent incidents, such as the jamming that affected European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft, highlight the very real risks of malicious attacks.
However, although GNSS is widely recognised for its role in positioning and navigation, its equally critical function in delivering precise timing is often overlooked. Sub-microsecond timing accuracy is essential for modern society, enabling synchronised power grids, resilient broadcast and cellular networks, accurate financial trade timestamping and reliable industrial automation. And, systems that rely exclusively on GNSS for timing are increasingly vulnerable to disruption, whether through accidental outages or deliberate interference.
With global leaders gathering in one location throughout the year for major events like the World Economic Forum, G20, NATO Summit and COP31, the potential for targeted disruption may be even greater, as Prof Aled Catherall of Plextek explores…
A Silent Weapon in Hybrid Conflict
In response, attention is increasingly turning to the need for real-time detection of GNSS disruptions, using layered technologies to assure Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) data across both autonomous and crewed systems. By continuously assessing GNSS signal integrity, comparing it against multiple, diverse data sources, such approaches provide early warning of jamming, spoofing and other anomalies before they escalate into operational or safety-critical failures. When GNSS disruption occurs, the ability to draw on a range of other data sources, such as inertial sensors, atomic clocks and other complementary technologies provides resilience and the ability to continue operating in the absence of reliable and trustworthy GNSS.
This capability is already strengthening the ability of global armed forces to monitor, secure, and protect national airspace and critical PNT infrastructure during major international events. By enhancing situational awareness, it enables faster anomaly detection, more accurate threat assessment, and coordinated protective measures across both the physical and cyber domains, a crucial requirement when safeguarding sensitive airspace and high-profile global gatherings.
If GNSS resilience were not robust, the repercussions could be severe. Disruption to timing and navigation signals can affect everything from aircraft routing and air traffic control coordination to military communications, surveillance systems, and emergency response operations. In a worst-case scenario, compromised GNSS could create confusion in crowded airspace, delay critical decision-making, or increase the risk of misidentifying threats during already heightened security conditions.
In such circumstances, established protocols and emergency response procedures would be activated immediately. Armed Forces and aviation authorities would shift to contingency navigation and timing systems, such as inertial navigation, terrestrial-based backups, or alternative secure PNT sources. Airspace restrictions could be rapidly enforced, with flights rerouted or grounded depending on the severity of the disruption. Simultaneously, cyber and electronic warfare teams would work to identify the source of interference, assess whether it is accidental or hostile, and deploy countermeasures to contain the threat.
This coordinated response, spanning defence, aviation, and cybersecurity stakeholders, is essential to maintaining operational continuity, protecting civilian safety, and ensuring that major international events remain secure even in the face of sophisticated GNSS disruption attempts.
The Art of (Modern) War
Governments are now actively modelling and stress-testing the economic consequences of GNSS outages, recognising the sheer scale of the risk. The UK government, for example, has estimated that a nationwide GNSS disruption lasting just 24 hours would cost the economy more than £1.4 billion, with similar, or even greater, impacts likely across other highly digitised nations. For transport systems in particular, GNSS degradation can be profoundly disruptive, affecting aircraft navigation, maritime operations, logistics supply chains and road networks alike, and exposing critical national infrastructure to cascading failures that extend far beyond the initial outage.
What makes this risk even more urgent is the changing nature of warfare and global security. Defence spending is rising sharply worldwide, not solely because of traditional military threats, but because conflict has evolved into a far more complex arena. Modern warfare is increasingly fought through electronic disruption, cyber interference, and space-based vulnerabilities rather than the trench-style confrontations of the past. GNSS has become a strategic target in this new landscape: jamming, spoofing and signal denial are now recognised tools of hybrid warfare, capable of undermining both civilian stability and military readiness without a single shot being fired.
This shift is driving significant investment into resilience measures, as nations seek to reduce dependence on any single source of positioning, navigation and timing. The future will likely see a layered approach to PNT security, combining alternative satellite systems, terrestrial backups, inertial navigation, and advanced monitoring technologies that can detect anomalies in real time. Overcoming the threat will depend not only on technical innovation, but on coordinated defence strategies that treat GNSS resilience as a core pillar of national security.
Conclusion
Ultimately, as reliance on GNSS continues to deepen, ensuring its protection will remain a defining challenge of modern security and economic stability.
At major international gatherings such as the recent World Economic Forum, where global leaders convene with differing policies and agendas, the issue of GNSS resilience raises an important question: is this a universal priority, or does each country approach it differently? In practice, while the vulnerability is shared globally, national responses vary. Some nations invest heavily in sovereign navigation systems or independent backups, while others rely on alliances and shared infrastructure. But with the interconnected nature of global transport, finance and communications means that GNSS disruption is rarely confined by borders. Resilience, therefore, is increasingly becoming a collective imperative, one where cooperation, standards, and shared situational awareness may prove just as important as national capability.
However, despite growing awareness and debate, significant vulnerabilities remain. As reliance on satellite-derived PNT continues to deepen, the question is no longer whether GNSS disruption will occur, but how societies can build resilience against it, and how trusted civilian-military technology partnerships can help safeguard critical events, infrastructure and economies in an increasingly contested navigation environment.
